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Our experiment aims at studying the impact of two types of relational goods on the voluntary contributions to the 
production of a public good, i.e. acquaintance among the contributors and having performed a common work before the 
experiment. We implement two treatments with 128 participants from two different groups. In the first treatment the 
subjects are left talking in a room before the experiment (cheap talk treatment); they are not suggested any particular 
topic to talk about, nor are they requested to perform any activity in particular. The second treatment involves the 
performance of a common work (namely, the computation of some indices of economic performance of three 
companies, based on their balance sheets). The two groups of subjects are composed either by people with or without 
previous acquaintance. An equal number of subjects from each of these groups is then allocated to either treatment. 
After that the subjects played a standard 10-rounds public goods game in groups of 4. The groups were gender-
homogeneous. This allows us also to inquire for the possible presence of a gender effect in our experiment. Our results 
show that: 1) both common work and previous acquaintance increase the average contribution to the public good, 2) 
there is a relevant gender effect with women contributing more or less than men, depending on the treatment. Therefore, 
we conclude that relational goods are important to enhance cooperation, that acquaintance and working together are 
rather complements than substitutes, and that different relational goods produce different effects on cooperation. Also, 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Among the relevant discoveries of the so-called economics of happiness is that relational goods 
(RGs) play a powerful role in determining the subjective well-being (SWB) of human beings
1. It is 
not surprising; after all, a very short time elapsed since we were social animals to any effect, and it 
is highly plausible that we have not had time enough to adapt to the very recent individualistic 
society where most of us are living. The more we enjoy RGs, the happier we are (or our SWB is 
greater); hence RGs are normal goods. Probably they are not only final goods, but also intermediate 
goods, i.e. they are also part of the endowment of our human capital. A person well endowed with 
RGs is happier than a person who is less endowed; but s/he also has more human relations, possibly 
a more productive attitude towards others, a better experience in dealing with people, and so on. 
Hence we may expect that RGs affect not only our well-being, but also our activities. But what 
exactly is a relational good? A Cro-Magnon fellow would probably be very surprised with some 
current definitions, that point towards "being together" irrespectively of what is done while 
together
2. S/he dwelt in an environment where (simplifying) everything was made together. To 
disentangle being together from doing together would probably look quite convoluted and useless to 
her/him. It is reasonable to suppose that the feeling of "togetherness" we miss today, and which 
makes relational goods so precious, is strongly correlated with the cooperation that characterized 
(and characterizes) gathering-hunting societies, i.e, with the collective accomplishment of some 
basic duty. 
This hypothesis is highly coherent with a well-known criticism to the notion of homo 
oeconomicus (see, for instance, Strober, 1994; Ferber, 1995; Nelson, 1995), according to which 
people are used to socialise into groups (family, friends, colleagues, etc.) and are used both to rely 
on and to feel responsible for the (relevant) others. According to this interpretation of the homo 
oeconomicus, people’s actions can be expected to reflect their group identity and their differences in 
socialisation. 
What above provides support for the partition of relational goods into relational consumption 
goods and relational capital goods suggested by Gui and Stanca (2010, p. 109), and is also the basis 
for the hypothesis that we will try to test in this paper. The hypothesis is that there is a hierarchy in 
relational goods. To spend a night together playing cards or singing songs is less "relational" than 
spending a day working together to accomplish a relevant duty or to reach a common goal. Our 
concern will not be with the consumer good facet of different relational goods (how they affect our 
SWB), but with their facet as human capital goods; more precisely, with their effects on the 
propensity to cooperate. The hypothesis is that the endowment of relational goods affects that 
propensity positively. People linked by "weak" relational goods will cooperate less than people 
linked by "strong" ones
3. In other terms, while we may expect that all kinds or RGs enhance 
cooperation, we may also expect that the effect may be greater or smaller according to their kind. 
The normative implications could be of some interest: if it is confirmed that working together is 
                                                 
1 See mainly Becchetti et al. (2008, 2009b), Prinz and Bűrger (2009), Bartolini and Bilancini (2010), Bruni and Stanca 
(2008), Bartolini et al. (2007), and Pugno (2009). According to the first quotation, the economic analysis of relational 
goods started with Gui (1987).  
2 See for instance Gui and Stanca (2010, p. 109): "This framework has been developed with primary reference to 
encounters taking place within productive organisations or at their interfaces with counterparts in transactions. 
However, it lends itself to also analysing interpersonal relationships within families, informal social groups, or 
associations. Here the ‘conventional output’ to be taken into consideration may be, for instance: a home meal, the 
completion of a mountain hike, or the performance of an amateur music band. But the process of generation of 
relational outputs is basically the same”. Analogously, Gui and Sugden (2005, p. 3) claim that “relational goods are the 
affective components of interpersonal relations [that] are usually perceived as having value through their sincerity or 
genuineness”; and Becchetti et al. (2009b, p. 2) that “relational goods [... are] the expressive/affective side of social 
interactions, for instance time spent with friends and family, in meetings of associations or communities etc.”. 
3 See next section for a brief survey of the effects of cheap talk on cooperation.   3
more effective than spending free time together, the enhancement of cooperative behaviours 
through the development of relational goods would require a promotion of cooperative work; if the 
opposite is true, the promotion of free-time institutions. Obviously the mix of the two could, in 
principle, be fine-tuned according to the relative weights of the two kinds of RGs (and possibly of 
other ones). We may attach a label to the possible extremes. The first one (only common work 
produces cooperation through a RG) can be defined the "Marxian" notion of RG: RGs are the 
manifestation of the common (or "class") consciousness of cooperating workers. The second one 
(being together produces cooperation), the "Catholic" one - all people are brothers (or sisters), and 
feel (or should feel) so irrespective of what they do or think, because they belong to the same 
church: actually, Church comes from the Latin Ecclesia, which in turn comes from the Greek word 
Εκκλησία, whose meaning is "general assembly". For our paper these labels are purely illustrative, 
but they help us to remember that the assessment of the role of RGs is likely to be crucial both for 
the Christian and for the socialist social philosophies. We will not pursue further this subject, but 
we think it is sensible to call it into light to emphasize the richness of contents that characterizes the 
study of RGs. 
Our approach is experimental. Basically, in our experiment we aim at studying the effects, on the 
propensity to cooperate, of two different kinds of RGs, that is, previous acquaintance and the 
performance of a collective task. Section 2 reviews the related experimental literature, in particular 
the experimental literature on relational goods and public goods; section 3 illustrates the structure of 
the experiment and its implementation; after a digression on the gender effect in section 4, section 5 
presents the results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Related experimental work 
 
Experimental literature on relational goods is in its infancy. In their very recent contribution 
Becchetti et al. (2011) use for the first time the concept of relational goods to explain cooperative 
behaviour in an experimental context. According to them, no other studies exist which introduce in 
an experiment the possibility of consuming RGs in order to study their impact on cooperation. 
Becchetti et al (2011) do so indirectly, by referring to the concept of RGs to interpret the results of 
two previous experiments that study the effect of the reduction of social distance on deviation from 
purely selfish behaviour in an Investment Game (Becchetti et al., 2007) and in a Traveller’s 
Dilemma (Becchetti et al., 2009a). In both experiments reduction of social distance - through 
removal of anonymity - is the consequence of a voluntary choice made by subjects to meet the 
counterpart after play. This generates “the possibility to consume relational goods through a 
personal encounter that agents will share after having interacted in the laboratory
4”, therefore 
creating an experimental design which allows to study the effect of RGs on cooperation. The main 
results of the two experiments are then interpreted as the willingness to influence positively the 
disposition of the other players to the meeting, “which is a crucial factor to create and consume 
relational goods during the encounter”. The most significant result considered is that the willingness 
to consume RGs seems to increase the chance of detecting cooperative behaviour “even though it 
entails a monetary risk or a sure material sacrifice”. 
If we accept that the endowment of relational goods decreases if competition increases, some 
experiments on the effects of competition could be assumed to consider the effect of lacking of 
relational goods on that propensity. Brandts et al. (2009) study the effects of competitive rivalry on 
the disposition towards others in a social dilemma game without complete contracts. They find that 
rivalry impacts negatively on the behavioural disposition towards those interacted with, and 
decreases ‘subsequent willingness to help’, potentially leading to the ‘obstruction of future 
cooperation’ (p. 20). Besides, they find that: rivalry neither increases efficiency nor does it favour 
                                                 
4 No indication of the page because quotations are from the manuscript (here and below).   4
the short side of the exchange relation in terms of gains in earnings; it has a negative effect on the 
subjective well-being of those on the long side, while it increases the well-being of those on the 
short side, therefore generating inequalities. A negative effect of competition on the propensity to 
cooperate has also been found by Canegallo et al. (2008) and by Carpenter (2005). 
On the other hand, since the early experimental contributions (for instance, Smith, 1979, 1980; 
Marwell and Ames, 1981), experimental literature on the public goods allocation problem has 
grown extensively in many different directions. A very consistent number of experimental works 
studied (both in single and multiple-round experiments) the effects on contribution rates of different 
treatment factors, like the levels of the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR); the size of the players’ 
group; the distinction between internal and external return; the existence of repetition with a fixed 
or a variable group; the opportunity to punish or reward the other players; the possibility for 
participants or experimenters to observe individual contributions; the introduction of pre-play 
communication (for references see surveys by Ledyard, 1995; Holt 2006; and works by Isaac et al., 
1984; Isaac and Walker, 1988a, 1988b; Isaac et al., 1994; Goeree et al., 2002; Croson, 1996; 
Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni et al., 2003, among many others). Other experiments have studied 
variations in the payoff structure (by introduction of a non-linear payoff functions, see Laury and 
Holt, 2000 for a survey), or by requiring that total contributions exceed a specified threshold before 
any benefit can occur (see Bagnoli and McKee, 1991; Croson and Marks, 2000, Canegallo et al., 
2008); the effects of other factors like culture, age and gender; the effect of altruism, of relative 
earnings or attitude toward others (see Laury and Holt, 2000 for a survey). 
Our implementation of the PGs problem follows the standard structure for research in this area, a 
game with multiple stages with a fixed group and constant MPCR, as introduced by Isaac et al. 
(1984). Since we introduce a form of pre-play communication (cheap talk), out of all the factors 
which may have an impact on contribution levels, the experimental study of the effects of non-
binding pre-play communication on free-riding behaviour is of particular relevance for this work. 
The issue of communication has been addressed by many experimental works which have 
studied the impact of non-binding pre-play communication – cheap talk – on cooperative behaviour 
and efficiency, in both non-threshold and threshold environments (see Ledyard, 1995; Davis and 
Holt, 1993 for surveys). In non-threshold games – despite the theoretical prediction of no effect – 
many studies have found a significant increase in group payoffs in social dilemma experiments 
(Dawes et al., 1977) and in the level of contributions and efficiency in PGs (Isaac et al., 1985); 
Isaac and Walker (1988b) notice how their results document the “impact of face-to-face 
communication in the reduction of free riding behavior” (p. 602), even when communication is 
costly (Isaac and Walker, 1991). Differently from the benchmark case, in presence of 
communication, repetition seems to increase cooperation (see Leyard, 1995 for a survey). Evidence 
is more mixed in threshold environments (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1991 among others). 
However, discussing in more detail Isaac and Walker’s (1988b) results, Davis and Holt (1993) 
also note that nonbinding communication works to increase contributions only if environments are 
sufficiently simple, with a small number of participants, and that results are not particularly robust, 
thus ruling out communication as a “particular general remedy” to the PGs problem (p. 337). 
More recently many authors have studied the impact of different forms of communication on 
cooperation and efficiency in different contexts (see among others Belianin and Novarese, 2005; 
Cason and Kahn, 1999; Bochet et al., 2006; Wilson and Sell, 1997; Güth et al., 2007) with mixed 
results, which, however, establish cheap talk as an important factor to enhance cooperation. Hence 
in our experiment we use a cheap talk environment as a benchmark, to rule out the possibility that 
an apparent effect of relational goods be due to the cheap talk that unavoidably accompanies it. 
To our knowledge, only three papers may be compared more directly to ours. Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) and Cadsby and Maynes (1998) implement a design based on a threshold public 
goods game (TPGG), in which a sort of common work is present. A half of the subjects involved 
are requested to fill in a questionnaire before the experiment. The questionnaire “asks participants 
to share information about themselves. The goal […] was to engender a sense of membership in a   5
group”
5. The other half of the participants are randomly selected and play the TPGG without any 
previous treatment. Solow and Kirkwood (2002) test the effect of group identity in a basic (i.e. 
without threshold) public goods game (PGG). They select one half of the subjects “from a […] pool 
of undergraduates […] who had volunteered to take part in experiments generally” (p. 406) and the 
other half from the University of Iowa Hawkeye Marching Band. The former constitute the group of 
“strangers”, the latter that of people having a group identity. In addition, half of the strangers filled 
in a questionnaire as in Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) and in Cadsby and Maynes (1998), 
while the other half just played the PGG. 
Our design differs from those used in the works quoted above in two fundamental aspects. The 
first is that our cheap talk is not finalised to the accomplishment of any duty, and does not concern 
the players’ strategies as in the public goods literature on cheap talk, but it is simply left open to the 
subjects. The second difference is in how we build the group identity: we do not rely on the mutual 
exchange of personal information nor on something in between a hobby and a job (playing in the 
Band), but rather on a task which is very closely related to the type of studies followed by the 
subjects and  mirrors a possible job. 
 
 
3.  The experimental design and implementation 
 
The experiment was conducted by the Laboratorio di Economia Sperimentale e Simulativa of the 
University of Piemonte Orientale at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Torino. A total 
of 128 undergraduate students took part in the experiment in 32 sessions, 8 for each of the 4 
treatments. Out of them, 64 were females and 64 were males equally distributed across the sessions 
and the treatments: the groups were made of subjects of the same gender, to avoid possible chivalry 
(see Eckel and Grossman, 2001) or jealousy effects. 
The game. In each session 4 subjects of the same gender were asked to play 10 repetitions of the 
following standard version of a public goods game (PGG). In each repetition each subject was 
endowed with 60 experimental monetary units (EMU) of the value of €0.01 each, and s/he had to 
decide whether to keep them or to allocate all or part of them to a common fund. The total amount 
of the EMU allocated to the fund were doubled and divided in equal parts to all participants, 
irrespective of how much each one had contributed to the fund. Every EMU which was not 
allocated to the common fund remained wholly to the participant as earnings, while for each EMU 
that the participant allocated to the fund - and for each EMU allocated to the fund by another 
participant- s/he kept as earnings 0.5 EMU. The total earnings in a session were given by the sum of 
what was earned in each of the 10 repetitions. No participation fee was paid. 
In this standard version of PGG the unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium predicts always 
to contribute nothing to the common fund (perfect free-riding), while the Pareto-efficient solution 
predicts allocation to the fund of all the initial endowment (perfect cooperation). 
The treatments. The experimental set-up consisted of four different treatments which combined 
the following different features:1) the subjects knew each other when registering to the session, in 
which case it was required in the invitation to register together as a group for the same session; 2) 
the subjects did not know each other, in which case they registered to the experiment individually; 
3) before playing the PGG the subjects have been asked either to perform a common work or 4) to 
engage in a cheap talk. In the common work treatment the subjects were given the balance sheets of 
three different companies and had to perform a budget analysis task, by calculating the Return on 
Sales (ROS), Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Equity (ROE) ratios, and the cash flow 
margins for each company. They were asked to write down a short report and ranking of the 
companies on the basis of their calculations. The task lasted about 45-50 minutes. In the cheap talk 
treatment the subjects were gathered in a separate room and left together to chat. Differently from 
                                                 
5 Cadsby and Maynes (1998, p. 608).   6
other experiments, where cheap talk always implies pre-play communication on the game strategies, 
here no hint was given to the subjects about the topic of their conversation. In summary, we have 
the following four different treatments: 1) Previous acquaintance and common work; 2) previous 
acquaintance and cheap talk; 3) no previous acquaintance and common work; 4) no previous 
acquaintance and cheap talk, each treatment played by 4 groups of 4 males and 4 groups of 4 female 
subjects. As explained in the previous section, the cheap talk treatment is the benchmark for the 
assessment of the role of the two relational goods. 
At the beginning of each session the subjects gathered in front of the computer room. In the 
common work treatment they were asked to sit together around a single computer terminal in the 
centre of the room which was available to them for consulting any material they might have needed 
to complete the task. In the cheap talk treatment they were taken to a different small room (with no 
computers) and asked to wait while the computer room was set and were conducted back to the 
computer room after 20 minutes. 
Once the common work or the cheap talk was over, the subjects were sat at the four computer 
terminals at the extreme corners of the room, so that no communication was possible. At the 
beginning of the experiment the instructions appeared sequentially on each participant’s computer 
screen and were read aloud by the experimenter at the same pace; the instructions would proceed to 
the following page only when all the four participants had clicked on the ‘Continue’ button on the 
screen. 
The PGG game described above was illustrated to the subjects. It was made clear to them that 
their total earnings would be the sum of the earnings in each repetition and that they would be paid 
at the end of the experiment under the usual conditions of anonymity. It was highlighted that all the 
initial sum would be kept as earnings in case no EMU was allocated to the common fund and that 
the total earnings in case all participants allocated all the sum to the fund would be 120 EMU. After 
the description a trial round was run, making clear that the choice in this round would not contribute 
to the final earnings. After this a written summary of the instructions was distributed to the subjects. 
and the real experiment started. 
In each repetition the subjects faced a screen with an empty box where they had to enter the 
amount of EMU they wanted to allocate to the common fund. It was reminded to them that they had 
60 EMU to allocate, and 2 minutes to take their decision, write the number and click the ‘Save’ 
button; after that time they would earn nothing on that repetition and would not be considered for 
the common fund division. After each subject had taken the decision or the time allocated had 
passed, a new screen for a new repetition appeared. In every repetition each subject could see 
summarized in a table the total amount of the common fund (but not the amount allocated by each 
subject), her/his earnings for that repetition, the amount of EMU kept and the division of the 
common fund and the total profit up to that repetition in EMU and euros. At the end of the 10 
repetitions the total profit (in EMU and euros) appeared on the screen. 
Once the experiment was over, the subjects were asked to leave the room and come back 
individually to be paid and fill in their receipts. 
 
 
4.  A digression on the role of gender effects 
 
Among the number of results obtained by the experimental literature, one appears to be common 
to (almost) all the designs and settings: gender matters for choices. Croson and Gneezy (2009) sum 
up this individuating three macro-results: 1) women are more risk averse than men, 2) women and 
men are not differently socially oriented, but the social preferences of the former are more 
malleable than those of the latter; 3) women are more averse to competition than men. A public 
goods game, as the one that we use in this work, involves a certain level of risk and is based on pro-
social attitudes. However difference (1) narrows as education and labour income increase (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009); while our subjects are undergraduate students, and have no significant labour   7
income, they have a high level of education, which should therefore attenuate the effect of risk. As 
for effect (2), Nowell and Tinkler (1994), Rooney et al. (2005) and the survey by Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) find that women are generally more generous than men, and that this holds also in 
public goods games. This general finding is consistent with Gilligan (1982), who claims that 
women think of social problems in terms of care and responsibility in relationships, whilst men 
emphasise the role of rights and rules. Indeed, on this psychological basis it is straightforward to 
expect that, in a public goods game, women contribute more than men. However, while males’ 
behaviour does not react significantly to different designs and contexts, that of females does 
(Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Gilligan (1982) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest also that, while 
women should contribute more, they might respond quicker than males to the context and thus 
converge faster than males to the equilibrium (namely free riding); since cooperation and free riding 
are mutually exclusive, in reality it is not possible to cast any hypothesis on women’s behaviour ex 
ante. In particular women’s generosity is more evident in mixed-gender than in single-gender 
(female only) groups. This last result, however, does not appear to be robust across different games 
and contexts. Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) find the opposite effect: in their experiment 
(based on a PG game) females contributed significantly less than males; Cadsby and Maynes (1998) 
find no gender effect in a replication of Brown-Kruse and Hummels’ design as well as in a 
threshold public goods experiment, and Solow and Kirkwood (2002) obtain the same results in a 
standard PG game. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) find that people tend to be more cooperative 
with persons of their own than of the opposite sex, and this outcome is stronger among women than 
among men. Croson and Gneezy (2009, p. 16) suggest also that “women are more sensitive [than 
men] to social cues in determining appropriate behavior” and conclude that women’s behaviour is 
much more context specific than men’s. In a public goods experiment, we should thus expect that 
the choices of the female participants will be more path-dependent than males’, i.e. women will 
retaliate more than men against behaviours that signal poor cooperation, while they will respond to 
cooperation more cooperatively than men. Nevertheless the literature also suggests that the presence 
of greed would result detrimental for cooperation more among men than among women (Simpson, 
2003; Kuwabara, 2005), i.e. the level of cooperation of women in a scarcely cooperative 
environment is generally higher than that of men in an analogous situation. 
A major element of context specificity is the gender composition of the group of players; in 
particular females tend to be very sensitive to this aspect and to condition their behaviour on it 
(Cadsby et al., 2010; Charness and Rustichini, 2011). There is evidence that both men and women 
condition their behaviour (and thus their choices) on the gender of their opponent(s), but the effect 
is stronger among women than among men. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that men and 
women are alternatively more altruistic than each other, depending on the price of giving: as it 
grows, females become more altruistic than males. However this is in contrast with Cox and Deck 
(2006), who find that women are more generous than men when “the costs of generous behaviour 
are low” [...] and “there is an absence of reciprocal motivation” (p. 597). Although the quoted 
works are not based on public goods games, they suggest 1) the presence of a gender effect when 
giving and reciprocity are involved and 2) the uncertainty of the direction of the gender effect. 
Eventually Charness and Rustichini (2011) find women to cooperate more when they are observed 
by in-group members than when out-group members observe them. This suggests that female 
players tend to cooperate less with strangers than with people they are already acquainted with. 
As the extant literature on the gender effect is not conclusive, it is not possible to cast hypotheses 
a priori; however it is likely that also in our experiment gender will play some role, and therefore, 
in order to be able to control this better, we decided to form homogeneous gender groups of 
participants. Of course, this is not a neutral choice, as the composition of the group matters, but at 
least it ensures that all the groups have the same variance (0) as regards to their gender composition, 
and therefore our results cannot be biased by differences in the sex composition of the groups
6. 
                                                 
6 On this see, for example, Iredale et al. (2008).   8
Incidentally, let us note that one might argue that our sample suffers another gender-related 
selection bias, as a typical BA female student of economics could be more aggressive than a male 
one, because of the presence of sexist stereotypes. An answer to this concern comes from Gerdes 
and Gränsmark (2010), who, studying the world of chess players at professional level (i.e. a male-
dominated environment), find that this type of selection does not produce outcomes significantly 
different from those of other environments considered in the literature. 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
We have considered mainly three variables, i.e. the individual contribution to the common fund, 
and the two possible extreme behaviours, perfect cooperation and perfect free riding. In each 
repetition, we define a player a “perfect co-operator” when he contributes the entire endowment of 
60 experimental monetary units (EMU) to the mutual fund, whereas a participant who keeps all (i.e. 
contributes 0 to the fund) is defined a “perfect free rider”. Basically this entails that these two 
behaviours are represented by a couple of dummies, which take value 1 if the participant has 
displayed the relative behaviour and 0 otherwise. 
The impact of the treatments and of the player’s gender on the absolute contribution is analysed 
by Mann-Whitney tests, while for the two extreme behaviours probit regressions are run. 
The analysis of the results highlights that both previous acquaintance and common work increase 
the individual contribution
7. Table 1 reports the average contributions for the whole sample: the 
participants who already knew each other before the experiment contributed on average 45% more 
than those who had no previous acquaintance (39.29 instead of 27.08); having worked together 
raises the contribution from 31.53 to 34.84 EMU, a difference of more than 10 percentage points. 
However, since the treatments cross each other, these two groups have a non-empty intersection, 
and therefore these results might be misleading. Columns 2 to 5 of Table 1 analyse the same effects 
in sub-samples which are homogeneous with respect to one of the treatments. So, column 2 (3) 
reports the effect of common work among those with (without) previous acquaintance. The figures 
show that the common work increases significantly the average contribution in presence of previous 
acquaintance, while produces the opposite effect in absence of it. This result, however, is due to 
strong gender effects that we will discuss further below: common work enhances cooperation 
among males, while decreases it among females. Column 4 (5) reports the average contributions of 
the players subject to the “common work” (“cheap talk”) treatment: the effect of the previous 
acquaintance is strong in both the columns, indicating that this variable has a positive and very 
significant impact on the choice of how much to contribute. In particular we can notice that people 
who already knew each other and worked together are those with the highest contributions. Hence, 
the results in Table 1 suggest also that the effects of the common work and of the previous 
acquaintance reinforce each other, originating a higher level of cooperation. 
Table 2 introduces a variable that proved to be very relevant: gender. We have already discussed 
the importance played by gender in the human decision-making process, and in particular we have 
highlighted that men and women generally show gender-related differences in preferences (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009). Indeed we find a strong and significant gender effect when the sample is 
divided according to the fact that the common work has been performed or not. In the former case 
men contributed 16% more than women, while, surprisingly, this result is reversed in the latter 
group (here women put in the common fund 14.5% more than men). The two effects are almost of 
the same magnitude, but they work in two opposite directions. As discussed before, this is 
consistent with Gilligan (1982) and Croson and Gneezy (2009); indeed, in our experiment in the 
first round the females without previous acquaintance in the common work treatment contributed 
significantly (at 90% level) less than the males from the same group: 25.37 and 36.94 EMU 
                                                 
7 In the following discussion all the results are significant at least 90%, if not specified otherwise. Details are in the 
tables.   9
respectively. Perhaps as a consequence of the low level of cooperation exhibited in the first round, 
the female propensity to converge to the equilibrium has then prevailed on the propensity to 
contribute. 
Given the presence of a gender effect, all the following analyses compare the different treatments 
within groups of the same gender. Table 3 highlights that the previous acquaintance fosters 
cooperation: the effect is very strong and significant for all the sub-groups but one (namely the 
females under the common work treatment). Table 4 reports the average contributions with and 
without the common work; here the effect of performing some task together is always very 
significant, and positive, but in the case of women who did not know each other before the 
experiment. However, also in this case the treatment has a significant effect, but its sign is opposite 
than expected (i.e. it is strongly negative). The results contained in Tables 3 and 4 underline four 
main results: 1) acquaintance has a positive and strong effect on the contribution to the public good; 
2) working together fosters cooperation among males and females with previous acquaintance, but 
disrupts it among females who are stranger to each other; 3) the influence of the acquaintance is 
generally stronger than that of the common work for both genders and 4) the effect of acquaintance 
is stronger among females than among males under the common work treatment. In sum: on the one 
hand both common work and previous acquaintance foster cooperation, on the other their value 
(and therefore their effect) is gender-related, and working together has a positive effect on women’s 
contribution only when it is associated with previous acquaintance. Moreover, in this case the 
combined effect of the two relational goods is stronger for females than for males. 
Public games allow for cooperation and for free riding. Free riding in our experiment is analysed 
in table 5. The dependent variable is a dummy which takes value 1 any time a player contributes 0 
to the mutual fund. The table thus presents probit estimates. Previous acquaintance and common 
work have the expected sign (negative) and are strongly significant for both the whole sample and 
the male sub-sample. Among women only the acquaintance has a (hardly) significant influence, 
suggesting that the results for the whole sample are driven by the males. Indeed this is not 
surprising, as we have already highlighted that women without previous acquaintance react in an 
opposite way than males under the common work treatment. The magnitude of the marginal effects 
confirms the results of the Mann-Whitney test: while both the common work and the acquaintance 
have a positive influence on cooperation, the latter is stronger than the former. The variable 
“period”, which captures the time trend for each session, suggests, consistently with the extant 
literature, that the free riding increases from the first to the tenth repetition. 
The last table presents the results for the behaviour opposite to the previous one: here the 
dependent variable is a dummy capturing perfect cooperation, i.e. the contribution of the full 
endowment. It takes value 1 if the players puts 60 EMU in the mutual fund and 0 otherwise. As 
expected both the previous acquaintance and the common work are positively related to this 
extreme cooperative behaviour both in the whole sample and in the male group, which leads the 
result in the whole sample, as among females the significance of the coefficients drops under the 
usual levels of confidence (for the same reason as before). Here it is interesting to notice that the 
influence of working together before playing the game is (slightly) stronger than that of the 
previous acquaintance, a feature somehow at odds with the datum on the average cooperation. 
Previous acquaintance appears to be a strong preventer of free riding, while full cooperation is 
enhanced especially by team working among men independently of previous acquaintance and 
among women only in presence of this last factor. 
Each group involves four participants; the variable “value of the fund" is the sum of the 
contributions to the mutual fund of the players other than the one whose behaviour is analysed, 
lagged one period. As expected, this variable displays a negative impact on the probability of free 
riding and a positive one on the probability of fully cooperating. It is assumed as a measure of how   10
a player reacts to the others’ contributions
8. It is interesting to notice that the marginal effect is 
larger for women than for men and that the effect is stronger on full cooperation than on free riding. 
This suggests that the individuals of both sexes are more prone to respond to cooperation with 
cooperation than to punish non-cooperative behaviours through free riding. In both cases, however, 
the marginal effects indicate that the influence of this variable is small in magnitude. 
Finally, also cheap talk may be considered a sort of relational good; the positive effect of 
common work on the propensity to cooperate that we found implies that the common work is more 
effective than cheap talk to promote cooperation. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that: 1) relational goods do enhance cooperation; 2) both common work and 
previous acquaintance increase the average contribution to the public good; 3) acquaintance and 
working together are rather complements than substitutes; 4) there is a relevant gender effect, where 
the women contribute more or less than men, depending on the treatment, and thus providing 
further evidence that the women’s behaviour is more context-specific than men’s; and 5) different 
relational goods have different effects on the propensity to cooperate. It is of interest that result 4 is 
not at odds with some previous findings (see also section 2 above). Brown-Kruse and Hummels 
(1993) and Cadsby and Maynes (1998) find no difference between the questionnaire and strangers 
groups overall, although the females who filled-in the questionnaire start contributing significantly 
less to the public good than all the other groups, yet they end up with contributions that are 
statistically equal to the others’. Solow and Kirkwood (2002) show that the mean contributions are 
the same for both the strangers and the questionnaire subjects; furthermore the average contribution 
of the males from the Band is significantly larger than that of stranger and questionnaire males, 
while no significant effect is detectable between different groups of females (although those who 
filled in the questionnaire contributed less than the strangers and those from the Band). 
Result 5 also deserves a further comment. We found that common work is more effective than 
cheap talk (with one exception), but obviously we cannot generalize this results to the real world. 
The case of non-acquainted females indicates that there may even be cases where the common work 
is detrimental. However, we found strongly different effects of different relational goods: common 
work, acquaintance and cheap talk. Our experiment supports the hypothesis that the specific nature 
of the relational goods is relevant. This holds also for not previously acquainted females: in this 
case the cheap talk is more effective than common work, but again the two relational goods induce 
a different behaviour. Needless to say, the last result was quite unexpected, and to our opinion 
deserves a deeper inquiry. 
To sum up, we may resort to a biological metaphor to suggest quite safely that the "relational 
goods" are more a family (or a gender) than a species. It should be of great interest to study the 







                                                 
8 Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find that informing the participants about the others’ average contribution does not affect 
the players’ behaviour. Also Frey and Meier (2004) do not find evidence in favour of this type of conditional 
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Buongiorno. Vi ringraziamo per avere accettato di partecipare all'esperimento. Non ci saranno 
particolari difficoltà, né domande trabocchetto. Dovrete seguire attentamente le istruzioni che 
compariranno via via sullo schermo. Le risposte che fornirete saranno assolutamente anonime. Non 
sarà in nessun modo possibile a chi elabora i dati risalire all'identità di chi ha fornito le singole 
risposte 
 
In questo esperimento avrete a disposizione un certo numero di Unità Monetarie Sperimentali 
(UMS), ciascuna del valore di 0.01 euro, che potrete versare in un fondo comune.  
Potrete scegliere liberamente quante UMS versare, da un minimo di zero a un massimo di tutte, 
secondo modalità che vi saranno spiegate in seguito. 
Vi verrà chiesto di effettuare questa scelta per 10 volte. Per ciascuna di esse avrete a disposizione 
60 UMS. \par 
Non è consentito trasferire UMS da una volta all'altra. 
Il vostro guadagno complessivo sarà dato dalla somma di quanto avrete guadagnato ciascuna volta. 
Questo guadagno sarà calcolato e vi sarà pagato alla fine dell'esperimento, seguendo le modalità di 
riservatezza descritte in precedenza. 
 
Il totale versato nel fondo comune verrà moltiplicato per 2 e distribuito in parti eguali fra tutti voi i 
indipendentemente da quanto ciascuno abbia versato. 
Per ogni UMS che NON versate al fondo comune guadagnerete 1 UMS, mentre per ogni UMS che 
versate nel fondo comune guadagnerete 0,5 UMS (dato che l'UMS viene moltiplicata per 2 e poi 




E' importante che vi sia chiaro che: 
- ogni volta in cui non versate nulla nel fondo comune, vi terrete la somma che vi è stata assegnata, 
cioè 60 UMS; 
- se tutti versano l'intera somma nel fondo comune, ciascuno guadagnerà 2*60 UMS. 
 
Adesso avrete la possibilità di familiarizzarvi con la videata di scelta che verrà utilizzata durante 
l'esperimento. 
La vostra scelta in questo caso non verrà salvata né contribuirà al vostro pagamento finale. 
 
Con la prossima videata comincerà l'esperimento. 
Vi ricordiamo che dovrete effettuare la scelta 10 volte. 
Comparirà una videata per ogni ripetizione, e vi sarà indicato ogni volta l'esito delle scelte 
precedenti: vedrete l'ammontare complessivo del fondo comune e il vostro guadagno, ma non 
quanto ha versato ciascuno degli altri partecipanti. 
 
 
Alla fine di ogni ripetizione, il valore del fondo comune verrà moltiplicato per 2 e interamente 
distribuito in parti eguali. All'inizio di ogni ripetizione il valore del fondo sarà zero.  
Vi ricordiamo che all'inizio di ogni ripetizione vi verranno assegnate 60 UMS (ciascuna del valore 
di 0.01 euro), che devono essere interamente utilizzate in quella ripetizione. 
Il vostro guadagno finale sarà la somma di quanto avrete guadagnato in ciascuna ripetizione.   20
Se avete dei dubbi, potete consultare in ogni momento il foglio di istruzioni che vi è stato 
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COMMON WORK 
 
1.  Sulla base del calcolo dei consueti indici di redditività (ROI, ROE e ROS), stabilire quale 
delle tre società in esame risulta più redditizia.  
2.  Confrontare anche le tre società sulla base dell’indice di auto-copertura del capitale fisso 
(rapporto tra capitale proprio e immobilizzazioni) e del quoziente di tesoreria (rapporto tra 









Good morning. Thank you for taking part in this experiment. There would not be any difficulties or 
tricky questions. You are required to follow carefully the instructions which will appear 
sequentially on your screen. Your answers will be completely anonymous. It would not be possible 
for the experimenters to know the identity of participants from the answers. 
 
In this experiment you will be given a certain number of Experimental Monetary Units (EMU), 
each of a value of 0.01 euros, which you will be able to allocate to a common fund. 
You will be free to choose the amount of EMU to allocate, from a minimum of zero to a maximum 
of all, in a way which will be explained to you below. 
You will be asked to make this choice 10 times (rounds). In each round you will have 60 EMU 
available. 
You are not allowed to transfer EMU from one round to another. 
Your total earnings will be given by the sum of what you have earned in each round. These earnings 
will be calculated and will be paid to you at the end of the experiment, following the anonymity 
mode described above. 
 
The total amount allocated to the fund will be doubled and distributed in equal parts among all 
participants independently of how much each participant has allocated to the fund. 
For each EMU you DO NOT allocate to the fund you will earn 1 EMU, while for each EMU you 
allocate to the fund you will earn 0.5 EMU (as an EMU gets multiplied by 2 and then divided by 4). 
You will also earn 0.5 EMU for each EMU allocated to the common fund by another participant. 
 
It is important that the followings are clear to you: 
-  each time you don’t allocate anything to the common fund, you will keep all the sum given 
to you, that is, 60 EMU. 
-  If all participants allocate the entire amount to the common fund, each participant will earn 
2*60 EMU. 
 
Now you will have the possibility to get used to the experiment screen in a practice round. 
Your choice in this case will not be recorded and will not therefore contribute to your final 
payment. 
 
With the following screen the experiment will start 
We remind you that you will have to take your choice 10 times. 
Each round a screen will appear, and each time you will see indicated the outcome of previous 
choices: you will see the total amount of the common fund and you earnings, but not the amount 
allocated individually by the other participants. 
At the end of each round the value of the fund will be doubled and wholly distributed in equal parts. 
A the beginning of each round the value of the fund will be zero. 
We remind you that at the beginning of each round you will be given 60 EMU (each of the value of 
0.01 euros, which must be entirely used in that round. 
Your final earnings will be the sum of what you have earned in each round. 















ROUND NUMBER 1 
 
You have 60 EMU. You must write in the box below how many of them you want to allocate to the 
common fund and click on “SAVE” to record your choice. 
 
 
You have 2 minutes to make your choice. 
If you have not written a number and clicked on “SAVE” within 2 minutes the program will  
proceed automatically. In this case your payment for this round will be 0 and you will not be 
considered for the division of the common fund. 
 
 
We remind you that you can allocate from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 60 EMU. 
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Your earnings in this round amounts to 85.00 EMU: 
 
- 35 EMU you have kept 
plus 
- 50 EMU from the division of the common fund (obtained by multiplying the common fund by 2 
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Round  Total EMU in the common fund  EMU you have allocated to the common fund 











ROUND NUMBER 2 
 
You have 60 EMU. You must write in the box below how many of them you want to allocate to the 
common fund and click on “SAVE” to record your choice. 
 
 
You have 2 minutes to make your choice. 
If you have not written a number and clicked on “SAVE” within 2 minutes the program will  
proceed automatically. In this case your payment for this round will be 0 and you will not be 
considered for the division of the common fund. 
 
 
We remind you that you can allocate from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 60 EMU. 
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Your earnings in this round amounts to 76.00 EMU: 
 
-44 EMU you have kept 
plus 
-32 EMU from the division of the common fund (obtained by multiplying the common fund by 2 
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The experiment is now over. 
You have earned 16 EMU, that is, 1.61 euros overall. 
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1.  On the basis of the usual profitability ratios (ROI; ROE and ROS), establish which of the three 
companies under consideration is the most profitable. 
2.  Compare the three companies also on the basis of the ratio of self-coverage of capital assets 
(ratio between net assets and capital assets) and cash flow margin (ratio between current assets 
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